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During the past few decades a number of European countries lifted the regulations that restricted the 
opening hours of shops on Sunday. In this paper we examine the impact of Sunday trade deregulation 
on employment, expenditure, prices and market structure using a difference-in-difference empirical 
framework and data from 30 European countries over the period 1999-2013. The results exhibit 
significant heterogeneity across products and sectors. We find robust evidence of a positive overall 
impact on employment. Expenditure also increases, but not for all retail product categories. We find 
no evidence of a significant impact on prices. Our findings have important policy implications, 
particularly for governments that try to combat high unemployment in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis. 
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21. Introduction
Over the last two decades many EU countries have recurrently debated the laws and 
regulations concerning retail opening hours and in particular Sunday opening. As a result of 
this debate many legal restrictions on opening hours have been relaxed, but still Sunday 
trading regulation varies widely across European countries. For example, in Sweden opening 
hours have been unrestricted for all stores since 1972, whereas in Germany it varies across 
parts of the country, as in 2006 the responsibility for opening hours was transferred from the 
federal to the state governments and many states have extended opening hours on weekdays 
and Saturdays, albeit with limited impact on Sunday opening. In France, although Sunday 
opening is generally not allowed, there are many exceptions as around 500 cities are declared 
as tourist towns and have been fully deregulated since 2009, while in Norway shops are 
generally not allowed to open on Sundays, except for the pre-Christmas period and for certain 
categories of shops (such as small groceries, florists and small petrol stations). Given this 
mixed picture across countries our aim in this paper is to investigate the European experience 
of the impact of Sunday trading deregulation. 
Different groups have defended the existing laws for a variety of reasons. Religious 
organisations have sought to protect Sunday as a day of rest and spiritual pursuit. Labour 
unions defend these laws believing that it protects workers from working overtime, especially 
in societies with weak labour market institutions and enforcement mechanisms. Small and 
independent retailers generally support the regulations in order to insulate themselves from 
competition on the basis of opening hours from larger, more efficient retailers. Finally, many 
people see merit in the idea of a common rest day, as it is evidently desirable to coordinate 
leisure with friends and family, believing that many positive externalities can arise from 
enjoying free time collectively. 
However, restricting Sunday trading also leads to various efficiency costs imposed on 
consumers, retail businesses and employees. Restricting trading hours impinges on consumer 
choice regarding when to shop, allows them less time to compare products and search for the 
best price and raises the opportunity cost of shopping time. Moreover, by narrowing the range 
of time available for shopping, it also forces consumers to shop concurrently leading to high 
congestion costs. 
Restricting Sunday trading also imposes efficiency costs on retail businesses as it does not 
allow them to fully utilise their capital investments. Moreover, by not being able to open on 
3Sunday, retail shops may lose sales to other businesses that are allowed to operate on that day, 
such as cafes, restaurants and cinema theatres. Being able to operate on Sundays essentially 
provides businesses with an extra differentiation tool and allows them to match better the 
preferences and consumption patterns of their customers. 
Finally, regulations restricting trading hours impose significant costs on some retail 
employees compared to others. Mandatory shop closure during Sundays is a disadvantage to 
those workers willing to fill non-traditional working hours, such as students or part-time 
workers (with women representing the largest fraction of those), while protecting those 
workers who are averse to work in such hours. This observation is far from meaningless at a 
time when youth unemployment is at historical highs across Europe, while in addition women 
labour force participation has been very low in many countries. 
During the last two decades many European countries have deregulated Sunday trading. 
However, there is no systematic cross-country evidence on the impact of these changes, only 
country case studies.
4
 We try to fill this gap by analysing the impact of deregulation in a
difference-in-difference empirical framework using data from 30 European countries on retail 
prices, expenditure, employment and market structure over the period 1999-2013. We like to 
think that not only the conclusions of this research would be useful in informing current 




 but in addition it will also provide
estimates that would allow stakeholders to quantify the direction and the impact of various 
proposed changes on Sunday trading legislation. 
Our results suggest that Sunday trade deregulation has a significant positive impact on 
employment, stemming both from new firms entering the market and from job creation in 
existing firms. Expenditure also increases as a result of deregulation, but not for all retail 
goods. Despite higher employment and hence higher labour costs, we find no significant 
impact on prices, which can be partly explained by the positive impact of deregulation on the 
number of firms competing in the market.   
4 Although within-country studies clearly have advantages, we think that the cross-country empirical examination is fruitful 
policy analysis avenue in the case of EU countries as: a) very few EU countries have a federal regulation system (e.g. like 
Germany) that allow regulation to differ by well-defined administrative regions, b) it would be very hard to find consistent 
and homogenous information on regulation and outcome variables (such as employment, prices, revenues, number of firms 
etc.) across regions, c) it would be very difficult to tackle empirically the possible spillover effects from one region to 
another due to the differential legislation, and, d) there might be strong country-specific effects (e.g. strong religious 
sentiment against Sunday opening in a particular country) that could bias the outcome when transposed to a different 
country. In any case, we see the cross-country approach as a starting point of any careful empirical examination and a basic 
guide to policy making on a hotly debated issue. 
5 See, for example, the OECD (2013) Competition Assessment Review in Greece. 
6 See, for example, “France unveils reforms to kick-start economy”, Financial Times (10 December 2014). 
4The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the theoretical and 
empirical literature that examines the impact of regulation of shopping hours and Sunday 
trading. Section 3 presents our empirical methodology, while Section 4 describes our data. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results and discusses their implications. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Literature review
The economic literature on regulation of shopping hours and Sunday trading focuses on 
four key issues: employment, prices, sales and market concentration.
7
 We analyse each in
turn. 
2.1 Employment effect 
The effect of deregulating trading hours on the level of employment is theoretically 
ambiguous. On the one hand, employment is expected to increase for those retailers that will 
open on Sunday. On the other hand, the increased competition due to Sunday opening may 
force some retailers to exit the industry and as a result employment may fall. The net effect 
will depend on the relative magnitude of these two effects.  
The empirical literature provides strong evidence that lifting Sunday trading restrictions 
will increase employment. Burda and Weil (2005) studying Sunday trading restrictions (or 
blue laws as they are known in the USA), using a panel of states in the USA and individual 
data from the US Current Population Survey between 1969 and 1993, find that American 
blue laws reduce employment within the retail sector by 4.2%, which mainly comes at the 
cost of part-time employment. In a similar vein, Goos (2004) examines the same American 
Sunday trading restrictions using data from the quinquennial Economic Census of Retail 
Trade between 1977 and 1997. He finds that deregulation increases total employment by 4.4% 
to 6.4%. In addition, Skuterud (2005) performs a difference-in-differences study of the 
deregulation of the retail industry in Canadian provinces and finds that the relaxation and 
elimination of Sunday trading laws increased employment in deregulated industries by 5% to 
12% between 1980 and 1998. He concludes that this increase was driven by an increase in 
7 It is worth emphasising that arguments in favour of restrictions on Sunday opening based on positive externalities from 
communal leisure or for spiritual recreation have not been empirically examined formally as they are very difficult to 
quantify. Nonetheless, Gruber and Hungerman (2008) provide some interesting implicit evidence. They show that in the 
USA, when a state repeals its Sunday opening restrictions (blue laws), religious attendance and church donations fall. More 
interestingly, they find that repealing the “blue laws” leads to an increase in drinking and drug use and that this increase is 
found only among the initially religious individuals, who were affected by the blue laws. 
5threshold labour (i.e. increasing employment) that could not be met by simply increasing 
hours of existing employees. Finally, Bossler and Oberfichtner (2014) provide difference-in-
difference evidence from Germany on the effect of deregulating weekday shop opening hours 
on employment in food retailing. They report a 3% to 4% aggregate employment effect 
driven mainly from an increase in part-time employment, while full-time employment was 
not affected.
8
 2.2 Price effect 
Similarly, the effect of deregulation on prices is also theoretically ambiguous. On the one 
hand, if Sunday deregulation implies an increase in competition (due to extended operating 
hours allowing more time for consumers to search and compare prices) then we would expect 
prices to fall. Clemenz (1990), assuming that consumers do not have perfect knowledge about 
prices and must gather information, which may be costly, predicts that, if longer shopping 
hours facilitate price comparison, deregulation could reduce prices by encouraging 
competition among retailers. Similarly, De Meza (1984) uses the Salop model to propose that 
deregulation can induce more competition, resulting in lower travel costs as well as lower 
prices. On the other hand, more recent research that endogenises the choice of opening hours 
(i.e. given the maximum allowed by law, retailers choose when and for how long to operate), 
such as Inderst and Irmen (2005), shows that deregulation might lead to some shops being 
open longer hours than others, but also that both types of shops will charge higher prices.  
The empirical evidence on this topic also seems mixed. Tanguay, Vallée and Lanoie (1995) 
study a deregulation of shop opening hours in Quebec and find that the deregulation resulted 
in increased prices at large stores and reduced prices at smaller outlets. The authors 
hypothesise that the deregulation lowered access costs for larger stores, shifting consumer 
demand and allowing them to raise prices, while smaller stores were forced to lower prices to 
compete. Reddy (2012) analyses the more recent changes in Germany and provides some 
evidence that liberalisation resulted in a fall in prices. On the contrary, Senftleben-König 
(2014), who also examines the recent changes in Germany, finds no robust impact on prices. 
Similarly, Burda and Weil (2005) analysing American blue laws find that retail prices were 
not significantly affected. 
8 Interestingly enough, Senftleben-König (2014) using a similar methodology and the same data source from Germany 
reports a negative effect on employment (-1.5%) mainly due to reduced full time among small establishments. 
62.3 Sales volume effect 
The impact of deregulation on the volume of sales could be either neutral (consumers 
simply substitute away from purchases during the week and towards Sunday) or positive 
(consumers either spend more out of their income or redirect expenditure from other 
segments into retail). According to Pilat (1997), the deregulation in Sweden increased 
turnover by 5%. Goos (2004) finds that deregulation increases total revenue by 3.9% to 10.7% 
in the USA. Reddy (2012) and Senftleben-König (2014) find no impact on sales in Germany. 
Finally, Prodromidis, Petralias and Petros (2012) provide empirical evidence that the 
extension of operating hours that took place in Greece in 2005 had a positive impact both on 
turnover and quantity sold. Therefore, although not unanimous, the empirical evidence seems 
to point towards a positive impact on retail sales, without exploring the particular channels 
through which this effect arises (i.e. whether it is a cross-industry substitution effect or a pure 
expenditure growth effect). 
2.4 Market concentration effect 
Finally, the impact of deregulation on market concentration is the least explored of the 
four key issues in the literature. In theory, concentration could increase if large shops are in a 
better position to take advantage of the lifting of Sunday restrictions and hence take trade 
away from the smaller shops. However, such reasoning is overly simplistic, as opening hours 
is just one of the many strategic variables (in addition to price, location, advertising, personal 
advice or services for example) available to competitors to protect and expand their market 
share. Moreover, we would expect a negative impact on small stores that are substitutes for 
large stores (for example, a small boutique vs. a large department store), but a positive one 
for small stores that are complementary to the operation of large shopping centres (for 
example, a small bakery in a retail shopping mall or district).  
The existing empirical evidence does not indicate any significant negative effect. Goos 
(2004) finds that deregulation increased the number of shops by 1% to 2% in the USA. In 
Australia there appears to be no relationship between the proportion of small retail businesses 
and the stringency of trading hours regulation in each state and deregulation does not appear 
to have had any deleterious effect on the viability of small retail businesses (Productivity 
Commission, 2011). We should bear in mind, however, that the effect of Sunday trading 
deregulation on concentration is by definition a long run effect that is much harder to identify 
empirically than the short run effects on prices, sales or employment. 
73. Data
To assess the European experience over the last two decades, we started by first
constructing a Sunday trading regulation indicator. The Sunday trading indicator takes values 
from 1 (least restrictive) to 5 (most restrictive), as you can see in Table 1, with the different 
grades mirroring the variation in regulation that we observe across EU countries. Our 
indicator focuses exclusively on the regulations concerning Sunday trading, whereas other 
indicators, such as the OECD product market regulation (PMR) indicator,
9
 incorporate
variations across countries regarding the maximum allowed opening hours on weekdays and 
Saturdays, alongside Sundays.
10
We then collected detailed information and rated each country’s regulation concerning 
Sunday trading over time (see the Appendix for detailed country information). Figure 1 
presents the evolution of the Sunday regulation indicator for thirty European countries (EU-
27, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) from 1999 until 2013. Notice two important patterns. 
First, the level of regulation varies across EU countries. In our estimation framework this will 
be controlled for by the inclusion of country-sector fixed effects. Second, the trend across 
Europe is clearly towards liberalising Sunday opening hours’ restrictions. All countries that 
during the last two decades have changed Sunday trading regulation (Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal) have moved towards a less restrictive regime. In our 
empirical framework we essentially examine the experience of the countries that changed 
Sunday trading regulation compared to those that did not. 
To evaluate the impact of the changes on Sunday trading regulation we also collected 
panel data on price level indices (EU27=100), real expenditure per capita (in PPS_EU27), 
real gross domestic product per capita (as a proxy for income), number of employees and 
number of firms from Eurostat
11
 for three products (food, clothing & footwear and household
furnishing, equipment and maintenance) and sixteen four digit retail sectors.
12
 The choice of
9 In particular, the sub-question related to the regulation of shop opening hours. 
10 In addition, the OECD PMR indicator is less useful empirically as it is published once every five years, which limits the 
precision of the timing of the regulation change. Nevertheless, there is a considerable correlation between the two indicators 
(correlation coefficient = 0.51 for 2013). 
11 Eurostat (2015), Purchasing power parities (database), Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (database) and 
Structural Business Statistics (database), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ (accessed 6 January 2015). 
12 The sixteen retail sectors are: other retail sale in non-specialized stores; other retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in 
specialized stores; retail sale in non-specialized stores with food beverages or tobacco predominating; retail sale of alcoholic 
and other beverages; retail sale of books, newspapers and stationery; retail sale of bread, cakes, flour and sugar 
8the three products was made under the assumption that they represent goods with different 
durability and thus purchase frequency (non-durable, semi-durable and durable, respectively). 
For example, one less day of shopping per week would disturb more the short cycle of food 
purchases that usually take place at least once a week for a given household, compared with 
the purchases of appliances, which typically take place much rarer. Hence, we expect food to 
respond more in the short run to changes in regulation than appliances, whereas clothing 
should fall somewhere in between. Table 2 below presents some summary statistics on the 
data. 
4. Empirical methodology
Our empirical analysis is based on the following difference-in-difference specification:
lnYjct = αjc + αt + β(Sunday Regulation)ct + γΖct + εjct (1) 
The dependent variable in (1) is the logarithm of the variable of interest in product (or 
sector) j in country c in year t. Time fixed effects (αt) and sector-country (αjc) fixed effects 
control for global trends and sector-country time-invariant characteristics, respectively, 
whereas, Ζct, includes additional controls (such as GDP per capita). The main variable of 
interest, Sunday Regulationct, is a binary indicator variable that takes the value one in the 
years after the change in Sunday trading rules in country c.  
This estimation framework constitutes a difference-in-difference model, where countries 
that deregulate are the “treated” group, while non-reforming countries (that did not change 
their regulation) are the “control” group. Due to the inclusion of sector-country and time 
fixed effects, the impact of regulation on the dependent variable is identified from countries 
that changed their Sunday trading regulation and measures the effect of regulation in 
reforming countries, compared to the general evolution of the dependent variable (for 
example, prices or expenditure) in non-reforming countries.  
confectionery; retail sale of clothing; retail sale of electrical household appliances; retail sale of fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs; retail sale of footwear and leather goods; retail sale of fruit and vegetables; retail sale of furniture, lighting 
equipment and household articles; retail sale of hardware, paints and glass; retail sale of meat and meat products; retail sale 
of textiles; retail sale of tobacco products. 
9The fixed effect specification allows us to control for time-invariant sector-country 
differences that may influence both regulation and the dependent variable (prices, 
expenditure or employment). Furthermore, the specification also accounts for common global 
trends, such as the boom period during the early ‘00 or the effects of the recent recession 
related to the financial crisis. Inclusion of these fixed effects allows for the most conservative 
possible estimation of the effects of Sunday opening deregulation. 
However, one may argue that using only a binary indicator for regulation might bias 
upwards any evidence of the impact of Sunday regulation changes. We tackle this possibility 
head-on by distinguishing between countries that have introduced substantial changes in their 
regulation (for example, Italy that moved from 3 to 1 in 2012) and countries that introduced 
less significant changes (for example, Germany from 5 to 4 in 2006). Following Card and 











When the country has not changed its Sunday regulation, the regulation index takes a 
value of zero. If instead the country has changed its Sunday regulation, the index takes larger 
values the more significant the reform is. This index takes advantage not only of the different 
timing of the deregulation across countries, but also of the widespread variation of the 
reforms that have taken place.  
5. Results and discussion
Table 3 presents the results for the price indices and expenditure on the three products (food, 
clothing & footwear and household appliances).
13
 The first two columns use the price index
for each of these products as the dependent variable. In column 1, where we use the binary 
indicator for Sunday regulation, none of the coefficients are statistically significant, 
indicating that the countries that experience a change in regulation did not experience any 
differential impact on the price growth of these products compared to the control group. A 
similar picture emerges from column 2, where we use the Sunday regulation index. None of 
13 All reported standard errors are based on a generalized formula, along the lines of White’s method of heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, allowing for country-product or country-sector level clustered heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
10
the coefficients are statistically significant except for clothing and footwear, indicating an 
increase in price growth of 0.05%.
14
 Hence, Sunday trading deregulation does not seem to
impose any significant downward pressure on price growth. 
The next two columns use real expenditure per capita as the dependent variable. Both 
column 3 and 4 indicate that the only product significantly affected was food, where its 
expenditure increased between 0.14% (when using the Sunday regulation index) and 12.5% 
(when using the binary indicator for regulation). Therefore, non-durables expenditure, such as 
food, seems to positively respond to Sunday opening. But is this increase a genuine new 
expenditure or simply a re-direction from other segments? 
In the last two columns we use the per capita expenditure share for these products (over 
the overall expenditure) to examine whether the increased expenditure was the result of 
consumers redirecting expenditure from other segments into these products or not. Results in 
columns 5 and 6 seem to indicate that, holding expenditure fixed, there was some substitution 
away from other sectors and into food, but the magnitude of this effect is rather small 
(between 0.11% and 11.5%). Therefore, Sunday liberalisation seems to have a genuine 
positive effect on expenditure, but not across all products, which is only partly attributed to 
attracting expenditure from other segments. 
Table 4 presents the results on the impact of Sunday trading deregulation on employment 
and market concentration for the sixteen four-digit retail sectors using the binary indicator for 
Sunday regulation changes. Table 5 presents exactly the same regressions but utilises the 
Sunday regulation index. In the first column of both tables we examine the net impact on 
employment. Five sectors in column 1, Table 4, and six out of the sixteen sectors in column 1, 
Table 5, experience a significant positive net impact on employment, with only three sectors 
having a negative net impact on employment. Results are not only statistically, but also 
economically significant: if one multiplies the estimated coefficients in Table 4, column 1, 
with the number of persons employed in these sectors for the treated countries before the 
change in legislation, the net increase in the number of people employed due to the Sunday 
trading deregulation is 59,685 people, or 47,035 people if you consider only the sectors with 
a statistically significant coefficient. This represents a 7% to 9% increase in employment for 
the reforming countries. 
14 Estimated coef.× mean value of Sunday Regulation Index = 0.029 × 0.016 
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In the next two columns we also examine the impact on employment, but now controlling 
for the number of firms in each sector. In other words, we examine whether, conditional on 
firms’ entry and exit decisions, surviving firms increase or decrease their hiring in countries 
that deregulated, compared to countries that did not change their Sunday regulation. Column 
2 in Table 4 indicates that in all five sectors with a positive impact there was also a positive 
increase in employment for the firms already in the market, whereas the three sectors that 
experienced a decrease in net employment also experienced a reduction in the employees in 
the firms that remained in the market. A similar picture emerges also from column 2 in Table 
5. Therefore, as also indicated in the literature review, there is evidence that Sunday trading
deregulation leads to heterogeneous results whereby some sectors decrease, but also a 
significant number of sectors increase employment by pushing existing firms to hire more 
employees.  
The last column in both tables examines the impact on market concentration by looking at 
the impact of deregulation on the number of firms in each sector.
15
 Four (Table 4, column 3)
and three (Table 5, column 3) out of sixteen sectors have a positive and significant coefficient 
indicating that the number of firms in these sectors increased as a result of Sunday 
deregulation, compared to only two sectors that experienced a reduction in the number of 
firms and hence an increase in concentration. Evaluated at the pre-treatment sample mean of 
the number of firms in the treated countries the coefficients in Table 4, column 3, imply a net 
increase of 1% in the number of firms or some 1,728 new firms entering the market. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the market shares or the size of these firms that would 
allow us to say whether sales moved towards larger firms or not. However, the fact that there 
is a significant entry of new firms for many of these retail sectors seems to indicate that the 
Sunday trading deregulation stimulates openness and competition in the market. 
6. Conclusions
During the last two decades many European countries have deregulated Sunday trading. 
Yet, there is no systematic cross-country evidence on the impact of these changes. In this 
15 Ideally we would like to have the sales or market share for each of these firms to measure changes in concentration, but 
such data is not available. For this reason we utilise the number of firms as a proxy for the changes in market structure (entry 
and exit) as a result of deregulation. 
12
paper we try to fill this gap by analysing the impact of deregulation in a difference-in-
difference empirical framework using data from 30 European countries on retail prices, 
expenditure, employment and concentration over the period 1999-2013. First, we find 
significant and robust evidence of a positive overall impact on employment, stemming both 
from the creation of jobs by new market entrants, but also from existing firms hiring more 
people. Second, we find that turnover in some, but not all, retail goods increases and that this 
effect is not solely driven by a substitution effect across retail products. Third, we document a 
net increase on average in the number of firms across sixteen four digit retail sectors. Fourth, 
we find no significant impact on the price indices for the three product categories that we 
analysed. 
Future research should concentrate on the aspects that we consider to be the limitations of 
this paper. First, we used price level indices for a broad category of products. Given the 
heterogeneity of the results even across these broad categories, the impact of deregulation on 
prices of particular products could also vary significantly. It would be thus instructive to 
focus the analysis on particular important products, such as food staples (e.g. bread, milk). In 
addition, to examine the claim of small shopkeepers that such deregulation provides large 
chain shops with an advantage requires data not only on the number of firms but also on their 
market shares. 
Despite the data limitations, we believe that our findings have important policy 
implications. First, Sunday deregulation can be a powerful tool to reduce unemployment, 
which is particularly important today where in many countries the unemployment rate is 
particularly acute among new entrants to the labour market, while growing share of the 
unemployed are without a job for more than a year. Providing employment opportunities in 
times of high unemployment has also strong spill-over impact, alleviating the “hysteresis” 
effect, where the skill base of the labour force erodes due to prolonged absence from the 
labour market, which in turn reduces the economy’s potential output.  
Second, the increase of turnover due to deregulation in some product categories could also 
improve the financials of retail enterprises. Even though opening a shop on Sunday as well 
implies increase of the costs that vary with opening hours, such as wages and energy, the 
shop’s fixed costs (e.g. rent, interest payments) are spread over higher turnover. The overall 
impact for the financials of the enterprises may not necessarily be positive; however 
deregulation gives the entrepreneurs the chance to test this proposition in practice.  
13
Lastly, the lack of impact on prices can be seen as reassuring for governments 
contemplating Sunday trade deregulation. The need for more employees could in principle 
lead to higher prices, with the shops passing the increased labour cost to the consumers. 
However, this effect seems to be offset by the increased competition in the markets that keeps 
prices down.  
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Appendix: Sunday trading regulation information by country 
The Appendix provides some more information on the rationale behind the scores of the 
Sunday trading regulation indicator, given to the countries in the sample. The sample of 
countries can be divided in two groups - treatment and control - depending on whether the 
Sunday trading regulation changed during the period of examination.  
The control group contains 23 countries, where the Sunday trading regulation essentially 
did not change between 1999 and 2013. In 13 of these countries (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Sweden), the Sunday trading has been unrestricted from before 1999.  
In ten more countries, while the regulation also remained essentially unchanged, some 
restrictions on Sunday trading were left intact. Out of this group, in four countries - Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, Malta and the UK - the regulations were relatively lax from the start of the 
examination period. In particular, the restrictions on Sunday trading in the UK were relaxed 
in 1994, with the restrictions varying across the country, from fully deregulated in Scotland to 
allowing stores larger than 280 m
2
 to open only for five hours on a Sunday in Wales. In
Luxemburg, most shops have been allowed to open for specific hours on Sunday, with certain 
store categories (such as bakeries, butchers and cake shops) and specific local areas granted 
more leeway. In Cyprus in the summer, the shops have been obliged to close for a few hours 
on Sunday (between 2pm and 5pm). In Malta, in contrast, there have been restrictions on 
opening during the night hours, as the shops in general have been allowed to open from 4am 
to 10pm, although exceptions have applied depending on the area and the type of shop.  
Restrictive regulatory framework without any change during that period has been the case 
for six countries in the sample - Austria, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Switzerland. In Austria, the governors of federal provinces can overrule the general ban on 
opening stores on Sunday, yet they have not taken advantage of this option. Quite restrictive 
has been also the framework in Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Switzerland, where the 
shops could open for a limited number of Sundays, with exceptions applying for tourist areas 
and certain kinds of shops. In the case of Switzerland, the exception has applied also to very 
small shops, which has also been the case in Norway, where food shops and petrol stations of 
less than 100 m
2 
have faced no restrictions on Sunday opening, with the larger shops opening
for the last three Sundays before Christmas. 
16
The treatment group, where Sunday trading regulation changed during the examined 
period, includes seven countries - Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. In Denmark, the regulation changed from being very restrictive up until the mid 2000s 
to being fully deregulated from 1 October 2012, with a transition period between 1 July 2010 
- 1 October 2012, when the shops were allowed to open for 30 Sundays a year. In Finland, 
the Sunday opening was fully deregulated for stores with a commercial floor area of less than 
400 m
2
, starting from December 2009, with the larger venues staying open for a limited
number of hours in November and December. In France, the regulations were relaxed in 
2009, when Paris, Marseille, Lille and about 500 more cities were classified as tourist areas 
and as such have enjoyed derogation from the Sunday trading restrictions. In Germany, the 
responsibility to regulate the opening hours was transferred to the state governments in 2006, 
with 14 out of 16 states opting to extend the trading hours. Sunday trading was changed in 
seven out of the fourteen states but only in a very limited way (either extending the number 
of Sundays or extending the number of hours). In Italy, the 1998 Bersani reform allowed the 
shops to open for 8 Sundays per year, lifting the limits on the trading hours in municipalities 
with high inflow of tourists, while the 2011 reforms liberalised the Sunday opening hours, 
starting from 1 January 2012. In Portugal, while Sunday trading in the previous decade varied 
between different part of the country, with the start of the structural reforms programme in 
2011, the Sunday trading regulation was relaxed, with some restrictions remaining regarding 
the opening hours at night.     
FIGURE 1: THE EVOLUTION OF SUNDAY TRADING REGULATION INDICATOR
Notes: The figure presents information on the evolution of Sunday trading regulation indicator across 30 European countries.
Source: Authors' estimates based on the Sunday trading regulation indicator constructed using information from the OECD PMR indicator on regulation
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2 Restrictions on large shops and/or on the working hours on Sundays
3 Varies significantly across parts of the country, depending on local regulation
4 Shops can only open for limited number of Sundays, with limited variability across regions
5 Shops are not allowed to open on Sundays
TABLE 1 - SUNDAY TRADING REGULATION INDICATOR
Source: Authors' categorization based on the OECD product market indicator on regulation of shop opening hours and legislation search in secondary sources
on timing and extent of reforms.
Variable Mean SD 10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile Min Max Observations
ln(Price index)jct 4.562 0.247 4.193 4.603 4.816 3.691 5.271 1350
Sunday Regulationct 0.073 0.261 0 0 0 0 1 1350
Sunday Regulation Indexct 0.048 0.264 0 0 0 0 4 1350
ln(Expenditure)jct 6.659 0.694 5.546 6.782 7.442 4.134 7.800 1350
ln(Employment)jct 8.210 2.137 5.313 8.315 10.895 0 14.051 5500
Sunday Regulationct 0.072 0.258 0 0 0 0 1 5500
Sunday Regulation Indexct 0.036 0.166 0 0 0 0 2 5500
ln(Number of Firms)jct 6.903 2.055 4.078 7.052 9.513 0 11.491 5500
ln(Number of Firms)jct 6.804 2.153 3.871 6.991 9.494 0 11.491 5649
Sunday Regulationct 0.073 0.261 0 0 0 0 1 5649
Sunday Regulation Indexct 0.037 0.168 0 0 0 0 2 5649
TABLE 2 - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Notes: The above table provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Tables 3-5.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Eurostat data on purchasing power parities and structural business statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable lnPjct lnPjct lnExpenditurejct lnExpenditurejct lnShareExpenditurejct lnShareExpenditurejct
Sunday Regulationct*Food -0.012 0.125*** 0.115***
(0.015) (0.037) (0.028)
Sunday Regulationct*Appliances 0.008 0.027 0.017
(0.017) (0.042) (0.031)
Sunday Regulationct*Clothing 0.032 -0.013 -0.022
(0.028) (0.040) (0.032)
Sunday Regulation Indexct*Food 0.002 0.089*** 0.070***
(0.011) (0.031) (0.024)
Sunday Regulation Indexct*Appliances 0.007 0.033 0.014
(0.009) (0.025) (0.016)
Sunday Regulation Indexct*Clothing 0.029*** -0.003 -0.022
(0.009) (0.028) (0.021)
log(real income per capita)ct 0.523*** 0.524*** 1.293*** 1.287*** 0.663*** 0.651***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.151) (0.149) (0.152) (0.150)
Country-Product FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350
Clusters 90 90 90 90 90 90
TABLE 3 - THE IMPACT OF SUNDAY DEREGULATION ON PRICES AND EXPENDITURE
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted price indices (EU27=100) in columns 1 and 2, the real expenditure per capita in columns 3 and 4 and the share of real expenditure per capita in columns 5 and
6. Sunday regulation is a binary indicator that takes the value of one when the country changed its regulation regarding Sunday opening hours. Sunday regulation index is calculated as follows: (max regulation indicator-current
regulation indicator)/current regulation indicator. Standard errors clustered at the country-product level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Eurostat purchasing power parities dataset and the Sunday regulation indicator.
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable lnEmploymentjct lnEmploymentjct lnNumber of Firmsjct
Sunday Regulationct* Other retail sale in non-specialized stores 0.138 -0.243 0.687***
(0.118) (0.163) (0.136)
Sunday Regulationct* Other retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores 0.377*** 0.247*** 0.258**
(0.091) (0.065) (0.111)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale in non-specialized stores with food beverages or tobacco predominating 0.170*** 0.149*** 0.042
(0.031) (0.040) (0.061)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of alcoholic and other beverages 0.294*** 0.127*** 0.295***
(0.090) (0.041) (0.111)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of books, newspapers and stationery -0.588*** -0.188*** -0.784***
(0.125) (0.050) (0.238)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of bread, cakes, flour and sugar confectionery 0.251** 0.104*** 0.292
(0.118) (0.038) (0.179)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of clothing 0.163*** 0.092** 0.140***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.045)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of electrical household appliances -0.605*** -0.309*** -0.579***
(0.051) (0.074) (0.102)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of fish, crustaceans and molluscs 0.083 0.053 0.060
(0.124) (0.086) (0.111)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of footwear and leather goods 0.067 0.038 0.059
(0.042) (0.034) (0.047)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of fruit and vegetables 0.144 0.092 0.106
(0.161) (0.119) (0.118)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of furniture, lighting equipment and household articles 0.081 0.026 0.112*
(0.097) (0.090) (0.059)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of hardware, paints and glass 0.065 0.023 0.084
(0.049) (0.049) (0.108)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of meat and meat products 0.007 0.025 -0.031
(0.088) (0.073) (0.053)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of textiles -0.168* -0.188*** 0.042
(0.095) (0.064) (0.082)
Sunday Regulationct* Retail sale of tobacco products -0.255 -0.113 -0.216
(0.279) (0.093) (0.342)
ln(real Income per capita)ct 0.467** -0.031 0.998***
(0.187) (0.138) (0.213)
ln(Number of Firms)jct 0.508***
(0.035)
Country-Sector FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
Observations 5500 5500 5649
Clusters 447 447 448
TABLE 4 - THE IMPACT OF SUNDAY DEREGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT AND CONCENTRATION
Notes: Sunday regulation is a binary indicator that takes the value of one when the country changed its regulation regarding Sunday opening hours. Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported in parenthesis
below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics dataset and the Sunday trading regulation indicator.
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable lnEmploymentjct lnEmploymentjct lnNumber of Firmsjct
Sunday Regulation Indexct * Other retail sale in non-specialized stores 0.217** -0.077 0.600**
(0.087) (0.132) (0.256)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Other retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores 0.375** 0.277** 0.191*
(0.150) (0.107) (0.113)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale in non-specialized stores with food beverages or tobacco predominating 0.183*** 0.201*** -0.033
(0.052) (0.060) (0.069)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of alcoholic and other beverages 0.292** 0.119* 0.264**
(0.141) (0.063) (0.125)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of books, newspapers and stationery -0.623*** -0.137 -0.952***
(0.235) (0.146) (0.258)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of bread, cakes, flour and sugar confectionery 0.159 0.070 0.173
(0.099) (0.060) (0.138)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of clothing 0.207*** 0.145*** 0.120**
(0.045) (0.038) (0.057)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of electrical household appliances -0.577** -0.207 -0.724***
(0.281) (0.173) (0.235)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of fish, crustaceans and molluscs 0.145 0.127 0.033
(0.119) (0.109) (0.065)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of footwear and leather goods 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.022
(0.042) (0.038) (0.048)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of fruit and vegetables 0.155 0.149 0.010
(0.177) (0.155) (0.098)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of furniture, lighting equipment and household articles 0.161 0.118 0.083
(0.138) (0.116) (0.069)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of hardware, paints and glass 0.055 0.049 0.011
(0.068) (0.055) (0.075)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of meat and meat products 0.120 0.135 -0.030
(0.121) (0.097) (0.058)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of textiles -0.219** -0.193* -0.053
(0.110) (0.101) (0.054)
Sunday Regulation Indexct* Retail sale of tobacco products -0.107 0.022 -0.151
(0.397) (0.166) (0.333)
ln(real Income per capita)ct 0.475** -0.009 0.961***
(0.186) (0.137) (0.214)
ln(Number of Firms)jct 0.511***
(0.035)
Country-Sector FE yes yes yes
Time FE yes yes yes
Observations 5500 5500 5649
Clusters 447 447 448
TABLE 5 - THE IMPACT OF SUNDAY DEREGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT AND CONCENTRATION (Sunday Regulation Index)
Notes: The Sunday Regulation index is calculated as follows: (max regulation indicator-current regulation indicator)/current regulation indicator. Standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported in parenthesis below
coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics dataset and the Sunday trading regulation indicator.
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